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The Middle Ground

Edmund E. Jacobitti

Review-essay on New Vico Studies, Vol. III. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press, 1985; and Bollettinodel centro di studi vichiani. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1985.

Bleib nicht au£ ebnem Feld!
Steig nicht zu hoch hinaus!
Am schonsten sieht die Welt
Von halber Hohe aus.
-Nietzsche

There are certain obvious differences between New Vico
Studies, with its emphasis upon Vico's relevance to the twentieth
century, and the Bollettinodel centro di studi vichiani, with its emphasis upon situating Vico in the context of his own time.
Moreover, Bollettino's concentration on the earlier period is not a
result of the fact that the issue here under review was published
in conjunction with the recent Mostra on Civiltadel Seicentoa Napoli.
It is rather a natural outgrowth of its founder's program.
Bollettino was founded in 1971 as an annual review by the
late Pietro Piovani, whose still-evident program was to set Vico
in his own time and overcome, among other things, the idealist
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view that Vico was but a precursor of Croce. This issue of Bollettino
describes the Naples of Vico' s birth, a kingdom in full seventeenthcentury crisis where government, language, hierarchy, agreedupon forms and relationships-all
the ingredients of common
sense-had become questionable, an order of things in transition,
no longer feudal and not yet modern.
It was a culture traced in Vincenzo Pacelli's "L'ideologia del
potere nella ritrattistica napoletana del seicento." Pacelli, in effect,
uses both sides of the palette to describe not only the revolutionary
changes in style ushered in by Caravaggio and i caravaggeschi,but
the rise of the bourgeois class who, more and more, were financially able to ape the nobility and have themselves painted on
canvas, sculpted in marble, frescoed on walls, and woven into
tapestries by the great artists of the time-Caravaggio,
Bolgi,
Finelli, Selitto, and so on. Pacelli notes similar changes in the kind
of art that appeared in the Church. As the purchasing power of
the landed nobility declined and that of the newly monied class
grew, the ecclesiastical authorities became more and more interested in the bourgeoisie, more and more willing to sell them
the space for chapels in the great churches of Naples. A veritable
scramble to sell and buy the chapels took place as rival families
staked out turf in the holy sanctuaries and the moneychangers
moved back into the temple:
thus while the De Franchis, the Spinelli, the Carafa had their chapels
in san Domenico Maggiore and the Cortone, Fontana, Noris, and
Coreggio, the Fenaroli-all contractors, Lombard nobles, great merchants, and moneychangers-took
over and decorated the chapels
in sant' Anna dei Lombardi, the ever active bankers Spinola and
Costa took up their places in san Giorgio dei Genovesi. . . . the
Borello family found space at Gesu Nuovo, Francesco Rocco at
Pieta dei Turchini, Giulio Mastrilli at Purgatorio ad Arco . ..

and so on ad infinitum (212). The growing number of middle-class
family portraits, the number of chapels filled with marble statuary
and sarcophaghi immortalizing bourgeois entrepreneurs like
De Franchi, Cesareo, Mastrilli, Cacace and so on serve as artistic
testimony to the growing power of money, the rise not (yet) of
l'uomo qualunque, but l'homme bourgeois.
The decline of the old order in political philosophy is set out
in Enrico Nuzzo's "I percorsi della 'quiete,' " which brilliantly
traces the efforts of Giovanni Antonio Palazzo and Ottavio Sammarco--those symptoms of seventeenth-century political crisisto wrestle with Botero' s and Machiavelli's notions of ragion di
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stato---and still preserve the fixed Aristotelian models and forms.
Yet-try as they might-as change escaped man's ability to control
it, as casuistic interpretation crept into counter-reformation religion
and politics, the old "Aristotelian" theories (really, by now an
Aristotle Christianized, censored, and warmed up for vegetarians)
were no longer able to explain reality. In fact, despite all the efforts
of Palazzo to redefine ragionedi stato into VERA ragionedi stato,
that is, raison d'etat without etatisme, the serpent, we read, was
already in the garden: right and wrong were hopelessly confused
and decline was imminent. It was that imminence of decline that
led Sammarco to renounce all change and opt for the status quo.
We see similar evidence of the accelerating social conflict and
shattered common sense in Pier Luigi Rovito' s discussion of
whether the Kingdom of Naples was a feudal or modern state in
his article "Funzioni pubbliche e capitalismo signorile," and in
Aurelio Musi' s "Tra burocrati e notabili" as well as Giovanni
Muto' s "Problema monetario."
New Vico Studies is the still-growing creation of the tireless
Giorgio Tagliacozzo, director of the Institute of Vico Studies in
New York. Tagliacozzo, like Piovani, has imprinted his own
perspective on his journal. Tagliacozzo' s central thesis is that ours
is an age peculiarly ready for and already open to Vico, an age
fed up with the Cartesian cogito, mechanical ratio, and shallow
speculation. It is a thesis hard to deny when one contemplates
the number and diversity of thinkers influenced by Vico, among
which-to name only a few-we find Isaiah Berlin, Hayden White,
H. S. Hughes, Louis Mink, Max Fisch, Norman 0. Brown, Max
Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Northrop Frye,
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stephen Toulmin, Ernesto Grassi, and so
on. The accuracy of Tagliacozzo' s theory is all the more evident
as one peruses his opening article in each issue of New VicoStudies.
In these articles, Tagliacozzo traces the origin and growth of the
interest also evident in the
contemporary interest in Vic~n
collections of articles periodically edited by Tagliacozzo, Verene,
and White that also aim at examining Vico's relationship not to
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but to the twentieth.
The general philosophical thrust of Tagliacozzo' s journal is
evident in the articles and review-essays which stress the key
points of Vico' s relevance to our contemporary world. The central
feature of this contemporary world is the disintegration of the
rationalist empire that had, in the seventeenth century, established Cartesian ratio as a-or rather THE-only permissible form
of wisdom, a form that supposedly banished skepticism and gave
man a fixed standard for measuring a supposedly fixed Newtonian
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world. Reducing a complex world to pretty theoretical schemes
became, for more than 300 years, the measure of great thoughtuntil today when, with the collapse of that standard, we find
ourselves in the so-called crisis of modernity. It is a crisis that,
like a bath of cold water, has brought us back to a face-to-face
confrontation with reality undisguised by wishful thinking and
whistlinp in the dark. It is a crisis set out in so much contemporary
thought but nowhere better than in Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard's provocative 1979 La Conditionpostmoderne:rapportsur le savoir.2 Lyotard
surveys the remains, noting the failures of those seemingly invincible rationalist metanarratives that once swept away local fables
and narratives with their inexorable logique;and he advocates, in
the place of the all-encompassing metaprison, what he calls "local
determinism," which is not too different from what Deleuze calls
"particularistic lines of flight."
Vico long ago chastised men of mere abstract theory ("Men
of limited ideas take for law what the words expressly say"),
predicted the collapse of "abstract reason run amok" ("Learned
fools fell to calumniating the truth"), and noted-against
those
who sought to avoid the harshness of the world-that "the world
is always governed by those who are naturally the best (migliori)."3
It is from the smoke and rubble of the rationalist empire that
Vico emerges as a guide to lead us back to reality, to a more
sober-minded and realistic assessment of man's place in the
world-an
assessment set out long before the rationalist pipe
dream swept us off our feet. Vico leads us back to that branch of
ancient wisdom that teaches that man does not find the world
fixed and stable before him, an arena in which he is free to wander
about and take the measure. Vico teaches us, instead, the verum
factum convertuntur, teaches us that the world is made by human
beings. Vico, in short, points us to the relationship of mythos and
logos;and his pioneering role is plain from the fact that, because
of the verum-ipsum-factum, he saw this relationship long before
we, with our current post-structuralist perspective, were led to
similar conclusions.
The relationship between mythos and logos is the subject of
Jose Faur's New Vico Studies article, "The Splitting of the Logos:
Some Remarks on Vico and Rabbinic Tradition." Faur-following
Verene, Grassi, and others--€xamines the Western idea that
"knowledge" comes only after we filter off rhetoric, leaving behind
the pure gold of ratio. As Faur points out, Vico's alternative wisdom rests on a logos and mythos that are not separate but interrelated. The ultimate implications of the verum!factum, in short, are
that man does not find the world, he founds it. He is not, therefore,
a discoverer, but a creator . This "founding" takes place, according
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to Vico, because of early man's poetic, creative nature. This is the
key discovery of the Scienza nuova; and it makes Vico extremely
modern, placing him among those who see language not as a
transparent instrument for finding truth, but as man's method
for constituting truth. Long before Marti!) Heidegger began his
quest for the nature of true being and unified presence, Vico saw
that being was not outside man but within him. Heidegger's quest,
in other words, was a case of tail-chasing.
In this sense, we may appreciate as well Hwa Yol Jung's
article in New Vico Studies, "Vico and Bakhtin: A Prolegomenon
to any Future Comparison," which stresses that "for Bakhtin as
for Vico, language cannot be separated from the conception of
reality or the world" (158). Likewise, Stephan Daniel, in "Vico
and Mythic Figuration as Prerequisite for Philosophic Literacy,"
also in New Vico Studies, provides an analysis of the "union of
sense-based language and sense-based nature" and of Vico' s discovery of the "mythic forms of thought that lie at the base of
rational inquiry" (61).
The idea that verum is the factum of man should not, however,
leave us with the idea that Vico's is an intellectual topics. In fact, it
is, as Nancy Struever ("Rhetoric and Philosophy in Vichian Inquiry")
and Daniel emphasize, a sensory topics, and it is this sensory
element that keeps Vico grounded in the real world rather than
in idealist metaphysics. Vico's topics, in short, provided him long
ago with a ready-to-hand method for getting to die Sacheselbst.
Likewise, we might add, Vichian topics also provide us with
an alternative to subjectivist Cartesianism, for Vico' s topics are
not grounded in the first-person singular, but in the first-person
plural. The litmus test of Vichian reason/practice is sensus communis: that which is held in "common." On the other hand, hostile
as Vico was to the anarchic epistemological standard of the ego,
he does not envision the erasure of the subject, for both subject
and other are required in order to account for the developing
sensus communis that surrounds and shapes us and which we, in
turn, shape.
In Bollettino and New Vico Studies, we have, in short, two
journals with different frames of reference. Still, there is an evident
perhaps because ofconvergence of perspectives; for despit~r
Bollettino's concentration on the barocco,the journal provides us
with a past world that is, with all its dissolving certainties, unnervingly familiar to our own post-modern world. The seventeenth
century, like our own time, was witness to the dissolution of the
quick fix, the ready answer, the narrative and the metanarrative.
And, because our age is so similar to the baroque, Tagliacozzo is
right about the timeliness of Vico for our own problems.
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Still, many eras are similar to our own; and, as New Vico
Studies frequently points out, there is more to Vico' s timeliness
than the eerie similarity of his age to ours. There is also the profundity and, well, ready-to-handedness, of his thought-an aspect
of Vico more likely to stand out in Tagliacozzo' s journal than in
the Bollettino, which is more strictly historical.
One of the disturbing things for Italian scholars today is the
lack of interest in Italian studies among American and Englishspeaking scholars. Everyone has heard of Machiavelli, Dante, Boccaccio-the whole Italian Renaissance. But at the end of the seventeenth century, at least as popular scholarly opinion has it, the
light went out. There were, of course, a few brief meteoric flashes
from Italy-De Sanctis, Croce, Gramsci-but, on the whole, the
center of focus shifted in the eighteenth century to France and in
the nineteenth to Germany. And today our minds still remain
focused somewhere between the post-structuralist pouvoirlsavoir
and il n'y a rien hors du texte on the one hand, and the hermeneutic
search for pure being, unified presence, and Horizontverschmelzung
on the other. Were it not for the fact that we know that academic
minds too (and maybe academic minds more than others) like to
tread only on familiar ground, we might find it odd that so many
Anglo-American intellectuals today should still focus their attention almost exclusively on France and Germany. Certainly, part
of the importance of New Vico Studies stems from its ability to
awaken us to a whole, hitherto ignored, intellectual environment.
The value of Bollettino is, ironically, also important for the
same reason; for even Italian intellectuals seem to have been mesmerized by oltralpini thinkers whose traditions, in fact, provided
the icons of the now evidently discredited Western "religion" of
rationalism. And even though scholars and thinkers in France
and Germany now appear to be in full retreat from those imaginary
objective worlds, the doubts, questions, and problems raised on
their retreats have themselves simmered for so long in their respective national contextual stews that their answers, too, seem to
bear a kind of national flavor.
It is time to look elsewhere-not back to Heidegger's pre-Socratics or to a misunderstood Plato trivialized into a Cartesian
rationalist-but back to the rhetoric of the Renaissance, even back
to the (supposedly nonexistent) intellectual traditions of Rome as
found in Cicero, Horace, and Quintilian; and finally, back to the true
Plato, to Isocrates, the Aristotle of the Topics,and to Aristophanes.
In this, Vico---one of the few moderns to understand this
other tradition-can play the key role, for his moderate rejection
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of rationalism walked a middle ground between Hobbes's baroque
bravado and Pascal's angst-ridden flip of the coin.
It is not possible to say, reading these journals, what Vico's
most important message was--there were too many of them-but
three, it appears to me, stand out. First and surely one of the
most important of Vico' s insights was his following out of the
verum-ipsum-factum, which he expounded in the De antiquissima
Italorum sapientia [On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians]. This
led Vico to a rejection of res cogitans and res extensa and to a
conflation of mythos and logos. This is the "ground" for nearly all
modern thought and far more fertile than the Abgrund that seems
up to now to have received all our attention.
Second was Vico' s effort to reawaken our appreciation of the
natural instability of human affairs by recalling the ancients' theory
of cyclical history. It is important to put this in a modem perspective. Vico' s theory of cycles is neither a fixed a priorinor a dismissal
of all things fixed. The corsoe ricorsoof states, men, groups, religions,
and so forth is again a moderate middle ground. It stands midway
between the extreme post-structuralist flight into what Prezzolini
(unfortunately, with approbation) liked to call "the night, the
mystery, and the secret," and the Germanic trek back to a camouflaged Primum Mobile.
Like many modem structuralists, Vico also noticed that there
was a kind of pattern to society's signs. This pattern is not, however,
a fixed structure, but a corso, a passage through three kinds of
natures, customs, natural laws, governments, languages, reasons,
and so on. This is the natural course of all things man-made.
This cycle is not a deus ex machina,but merely the norm-like
man's own birth, life, and death-lived out by most but not all
states. It has no definite time span and merely states that all things
man-made will perish and that moderation in theory and practice
is the only way to prolong the cycle. The cycle provides, in short,
a flexible "structural" prism through which life can be viewed. It
is not, however, a hymn to resignation nor a magic formula or
incantation: Aufhebung! Fizz! Goop!as one wag put it.
Moreover, the cycle is not one universal cycle, but many
intersecting ones. It is not only the cycle of one's own state that
accounts for the complexity of the world, but that of other states,
of classes, nations, groups, or all mankind together. Indeed, as
everyone has a perspective shaped to some extent by his place in
one or more corsi, man's opinions about how the corso might be
flattened out constitute themselves a kind of cycle. The only unity
is provided by the fact that our focus is always on and shaped by
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the rise and fall of the various orders of things. Stability, structure,
the state of nature, the thoughts of God and Weltgeists,
functionalism, Kantian a prioris, and so on-provide
us with
abstract fantasies and shield our vision of the true nature of things.
A major difference between Vico' s structuralism and the more
rigid varieties of the once-fashionable modern structuralists, lies
in the fact that because of the complexity of the convergent cycles,
Vico did not believe a totalist reduction of society through universal semanticization was possible. In Vico there is always conflict,
difference, asymmetry-in short, politics.Everyone has a different
perspective; and unity is, blessedly, inconceivable. Because the
puzzle never seems to have all the pieces, one can never eliminate
what Habermas dismisses as "border warfare." In short, Vico
shares a bit of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard's applause for "local determinism."
On the other hand, the difference between Vico and modern
Neronian radicalism lies in the fact that-while there is difference
(and differance)in Vico-langue, synchrony, and everything else
is not reduced simply to the event, to parole,to just "one damned
thing after another." Vico's is a middle ground between determinism and voluntarism, between, on the one hand, a meaningless temporality, a diachronic a posteriori and, on the other, a
mechanical Cartesianism or a Germanic, concealed, ever-disclosing a priori Weltgeist. Vico, in short, leaves us with an explanation
of asymmetry that is lodged in the real Heraclitian nature of "the
things themselves," in the corsie ricorsi:not a cure-all, but a realistic
analytical tool.
The importance of our recognition of this natural flux of
things, of the corso-an embarrassment, of course, to all selfrespecting and proper Moderns who believe everything must
either be meaningless or fixed-is set out, among other places,
in Emanuele Riverso's analysis of "History as Metascience," which
established the "cultural impact of one nation upon another" and
the dislocations that result.
The uniqueness and the importance of the cycle stand out as
well in Timothy Bahti's suggestive "Vico and Frye: A Note," in
New Vico Studies, where the meaning of time and of "keeping
time" -whether
God's or man' s---is used to provide a basis for
meaning itself. Bahti explains the Vichian base of Frye's famous
analysis of meaning as humanity's attempt to link its own activity
to that of nature. Time becomes not chronological and historical
but horizontal and reflects a series of concentric, converging circles
of human meaning. In Frye's case, of course, it is literature that
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converges and interacts with the other ievels of human meaning.
A third important lesson we can gain from Vico is his political
realism. Certainly the key message of Nancy Struever's brilliant
and insightful Petrarchan/Socratic injunction to seriously address
the issue of "how we shall live" brings this realism to mind. Thus,
she reminds us that the proper course for Vico was the middle one;
for Vico's rhetoric is not a destruction of philosophy as such, but
a destruction of "moralistic and moralizing philosophy," of
"academic colonization of the philosophical task." Vico is not
Jacques Derrida or Paul De Man; nor is he the classical, "moral,"
civic humanist designed by Hans Baron. Thus, as Professor
Struever puts it, if you start down the Derridean and Demanian
path, "you can't stop," while-if I may paraphrase it-if you remain in the realm of "simplistic Whiggish and civic humanist
assumptions," you cannot start.
In conclusion, we might say that both journals lead one to
an appreciation of Vico's place in modern thought-even
though
Bollettino gets us there by dint of a kind of Vichian providence.
In any case, both the Vico of the seventeenth and eighteenth and
the Vico of the twentieth century are necessary; for the point is
to remind non-Italians of Vico's way and to recall Italians to their
own traditions; for, as Bertrando Spaventa noted almost a hundred
years ago, even though "we got there late, we were first": 4 now
there is a post-modern paradox!
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